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Political Responsibility and Resistance to 
Civil Government! 
David Lyons2 
Like most prominent theorists of civil disobedience, Thoreau was a practitioner too. His 
famous essay on tlhe subject was delivered as a public lecture after his brief jailing for tax 
refusal.3 Although Thoreau refers there to chac episode, he mainly discusses in general 
terms our moral responsibilities under governments that supporc unconscionable 
injuscice. He chus broaches an issue thac theorists have hardly discussed - che ducy ro 
address wrongs done co ochers by one's government. 
Thoreau's essay influenced both Gandhi and King.4 Gandhi called it a "masterly 
rreatise."5 Nevertheless, although philosophers have recently written much about his 
subject, Thoreau·s ideas have largely been neglecced.6 
This neglect is understandable. Thoreau was a brilliant prose stylist who could secure 
the artencion of an audience and compel them to face discomfiting questions. But he 
was not a systematic theorist or rigorous analyst. An appraiser of Thoreau's political 
writings might conclude chac he could provoke political discussion and inspire resistance 
without illuminating basic moral issues. 
The scholarly slighting of his essay might also be meant as benign neglect, for 
Thoreau's views are controversial. His view of law and government is radical, compared 
with that of che philosophical literature on civil disobedience. 7 Recent theorists 
maintain that true civil disobedience manifests respect for the prevailing political 
system; Thoreau tells us plainly how little respect it deserves. Recent theorists argue, 
moderately and dlefensively, that disobedience may sometimes be justified, :at least if it 
is decorous and respectful. Thoreau contends rather that disobedience is morally 
required - that compliance with governmental policies like those he condemns is 
simply wrong. Paradoxically, he also appears to embrace an exceedingly narrow 
conception of political responsibility - so cramped as to suggest that he is preoccupied 
not with the suffering of those who have been wronged by laws and governmental 
policies but with his own moral puriry. 
This paper has two aims. One is to gain a clearer view of Thoreau's ideas about 
political responsibility - especially what I shall call individual accountability, or the 
duty to address social wrongs8; for I believe that the picture ofThoreau's position I have 
just offered is inaccurate. Another aim is to suggest and to encourage discussion of a 
broader conception of politica� responsibility than our philosophical literature generally 
acknowledges - a conception capable of supporting a duty of disobedience in view of 
social wrongs. 
Section I examines Thoreau's controversial attitude towards law and argues that it 
is reasonable. Section II presents an initial interpretation of Thoreau on individual 
accountability. Section III compares the initia] reading with other conceptions of 
accountability and offers a new interpretation of Thoreau.9 
I. Political Responsibility 
Political obligation and the duty to disobey. I shall refer to the collection of moral 
requirements (such as duties or obligations) that may result from one's belonging to a 
political community as political resjxmsibilicy. Only one aspect of political responsibility 
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has been addressed extensively by cheonsu. That aspect is polincal obhganon- a moral 
requirement of obedience co che law of one's commumt)'. As lC is usually understood, 
political obligation is comprehensive - a triply general requirement, applying to all 
members of a political community, all of its Laws, and all occasions for compliance. 
Because moral requirements can conflict, so that it becomes impossible to follow all 
of their guidance for conduct, most duties and obligations are best regarded as defeasible. 
A defeasible requirement calls on one co behave iin a certain way, implying it would be 
wrong to behave otherwise unless the precept is ou'tweighed in specific circumstances by 
some more pressing consideration. For this reason, as well as the face that morally 
unconscionable laws can provide occasions for disobedience, political obligation is best 
construed as defeasible. If ic were absolute it would be vastly more difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to defend. Most generously construed, then, political obligation amounts to 
a comprehensive moral presumption favoring compliance with law.10 
To understand political obligation as defeasibEe is co imply that lawbreaking might 
sometimes � justified. Philosophers who have recently addressed civil disobedience 
have generally held that it can be justified. As this suggests, however, theorists have 
generally assumed that civil disobedience requires justification. They assume, in effect, 
that political obligation obtains. This can be seen as follows. One may think of civil 
disobedience broadly, as principled lawbreaking, but many theorists have recencly 
defined civil disobedience narrowly - as lawbreaking that is public, nonviolent, 
performed by someone who accepts the prevailing system and willingly suffers the legal 
consequences of disobedience, or in other words ais a conscientious, respectful, submis, 
sive, and decorous form of lawbrea1'ing.1 l Why might anyone regard such conduct as 
in need of justification? The only aspect of civil disobedience, so conceived, that might 
make it seem to need justification is its noncompliance with law. The belief that civil 
disobedience requires justification thus presupposes that lawbreaking itself requires 
justification. In ocher words, theorists of civil disobedience generally assume that 
political obligation obtains.12 
The recent literature on civil disobedience was initially occasioned by re·sistance co 
admittedly unjust laws and social arrangements, such as the brutally oppressive system 
of white dominance known as Jim Crow .13 To assume political obligation in that context 
is to hold that moral justification is required even for disobedience to unconscionable 
laws and public :policies. That is precisely the point of the doctrine. Critics and 
champions of political obligation both recognize that even the best system in the real 
world can encompass unjust laws. Most champions assume that political obligation 
obtains in some real world systems, such as chat of the United States. 
Political obligation was traditionally supposed to be grounded on a valid moral 
commionent by the individual to comply with all of the community's laws. As it is 
implausible to suppose that all the members of a political community make such a 
commionent, one who embraces political obligation is well. advised to seek more 
promising foundations. Recent theories have conditioned political obligation on a 
political system's fundamentally just character or on the principle of fairness. 
Theorists generally count principled lawbreaking as civil disobedience only if the 
resister respects the system as a whole and acknowledges a moral presumption favoring 
obedience to law. That is one reason why theorists assume that civil disobedience 
involves willing submission to arrest and punishment. In submitting, the resister 
expresses respect for the system as a whole and acknowledges having breached a moral 
obligation to comply. 
That view of the matter contrasts sharply with the orientation of many resisters, 3
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including Thoreau. RestSters often say that they could not in good conscience comply 
with the law. They see themselves as noc merely justified in resisting unconscionable 
laws and governmental policies but as morally required to resist. 
Despite such differences, the positions taken by theorises and resisters might be 
compatible. The claim that compliance would be wrong does not necessarily exclude 
acknowledgemenr of political obligation. Resisters could recognize an obligac ion co obey 
the law but regard it as overridden in the circumstances. In the complexil)• of concrete 
social situations, some moral principles can prescribe compliance while others call for 
noncompliance. Moreover, a practitioner's stress on a duty to disobey would be 
understandable, as it offers a more powerful justification for disobedience than an 
argument that merely makes disobedience morally permissible .. Theorists' stressing an 
obligation to obey would likewise be understandable, if they wished to influence critics 
who assume that civil disobedience is wrong because there is a moral obligation to obey 
the law. Theorists sympathetic to civil disobedience might try to convert such critics by 
first acknowledging political obligation and then showing how an obligation to comply 
with the law can sometimes be overridden. 
Much of the recent literature on civil disobedience developed in the context of 
vigorous civil rights campaigns and anti,war protests that were especially controversial 
when participants broke the law. The civil rights movement of the 1950s emerged in a 
period of political repression during the first stage of the Cold War. While officials at all 
levels in federal, state, and local governments were illicitly persecuting dissenters who 
acted within the law, civil rights activists not only challenged the established hierarchy 
but sometimes did so by breaking the law. Even worse, in the eyes of those in power, most 
civil rights activists were African Americans who were expected to know their place in 
the officially sanctioned system of white supremacy. It is no wonder, chen, that many 
prominent persons criticized unlawful protests that were peaceful, public, nonviolent, 
morally motivated, and whose targets were legal arrangements that the critics agreed 
were morally indefensible, such as Jim Crow laws. Theorists sympathetic to civil 
disobedience saw that some of che critics mistakenly assumed that political obligation is 
absoEute. Those theorists proceeded to explain that political obligation, like other 
obligations, is likiely to be defeasible, in which case it can be outweighed, so chat 
disobedience can sometimes be justified. Thus, their emphasis on an obligation to obey 
may well have been predicated on a wise strategy of argument aimed at converting critics. 
Just as it is possible for resisters who stress a duty of obedience co acknowledge political 
obligation, it is possible for theorists who assume political obligation to recognize a duty 
to disobey. So the positions of theorists and resisters could be compatible; the differences 
between their expressed positions might merely be one of emphasis. All that is possible. 
But there is reason co believe they really disagree. On the one hand, theorists have not 
merely stressed political obligation; they have ignored the idea that political responsibil, 
ity can include a duty to disobey. On the other hand, while some resisters may 
acknowledge an obligation to obey the law, along with the respect for the political system 
that acceptance of political obligation assumes, such an attitude is not, I believe, 
characteristic of resisters. Although I shall not try to defend that general claim here, I 
shall argue that Thoreau lacked such respect for the political system, did not accept an 
obligation to obey, and that his position was quite reasonable.14 I shall consider first 
Thoreau's tacit rejection of political obligation and then tum later to his ideas about a 
duty to disobey. 
Thoreau on law. Thoreau begins his essay by disparaging both government and law. 
"Government is at best an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all 
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governments are somenmes, mexped1enc." (T 65) I; Polmcal syscems ha\'e no mherenr 
virtue. Any respect chey menc they muse earn, and chat lS normally noc much. The u.S. 
system lS no exception. Thoreau accordmgly says. 
Jc is noc desirable co culuvace a respect for the law, so much as for the 
nghc ... . Law never made men a whir more just; and, by means of their 
respect for 1t, even the well,dlSposed arc daily made the agents of 
injustice. (T 65) 
Undue respect for law leads the 
mass of men [to] serve the State ... not as men mainly, but as machmes, 
with chei:r bodies. They are the standing army, and the milma, jailers, 
constables, &c .... Others, as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, 
ministers, and office,holders, serve the Scace chiefly with cheir heads; 
and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, chey are as likely to 
serve the devil, without intending ic, as God. A very few ... serve the 
State with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist ic for the 
most part; and they are commonly treate,d by it as enemies. (T 66) 
But Thoreau neither expects nor demands perfection in government. "If the injustice 
is part of the necessary friction of the machinery of government, let ic go, let it go: 
perchance it will wear smooth." (T 73) He cautions potential resisters to consider 
whetlher the government "does enough good to counter-balance the evil," (T 6 7) and 
"whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil." (T 73) UBuc," he says, "when che 
friction comes co have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let 
us not have such a machine any longer." (T 6 7) 
As chose words may suggest, Thoreau's position is shaped by his view of official 
conduce. Although he begins his tax refusal in protest of the federal government's 
support of slavery and his state's support of federal policies, by the time he delivers his 
lecture on civil disobedience the U.S. has invaded Mexico in an aggressive, expansionist 
war, designed in part to provide more space for chattel slavery. The U.S. government, 
he says, is .. each inscanc losing some of its integrity." (T 65) When jailed for tax refusal, 
Thoreau "saw that the Scace was half,witted ... and chat it did not know its friends from 
its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it." (T 80) 
Thoreau perhaps comes closest to explicitly rejecting political obligation when he 
asserts chat one should "break the law" in order to avoid becoming "the agent of injustice 
to another. 0 (T 7 3) That does not necessarily exclude a defeasible obligation to obey the 
law. Nevertheless. I think it reasonable to take his statements about law and government 
co imply a rejection of any comprehensive moral presumption favoring obedience to law. 
I now want to explain why that position itself is quite reasonable. 
The claim that there is a moral presumption favoring obedience to law requires 
justification because just laws merit respect but unjust laws do not. If there is an initial 
moral presumption regarding unjust laws, it muse be co regard them with disrespect. A 
sound argument is required to show why we should comply with them. This does not 
mean that political obligation is impossible or that there cannot be good reason to comply 
with unjust laws. It means chat the burden of proof falls initially on the defender of 
political obligation. And it has amply been shown that the burden is difficult to sustam.16 
We can understand why by considering Thoreau's America. Shall we suppose that 
the African American slave, the Mexican whose homeland has been taken over by an 
invading American army, and the Native American who has lost freedom, land, and kin 
at the hands of the government are all morally bound to comply with all U.S. laws and 
official orders, including the laws most directly implicated in the government's uncon, 5
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scionable conduct� le does not seem much more far�fecched to claim chat th� Jew of the 
Warsaw Ghetto owed an obltganon of obedience co the surrounding German forces. 
},;0 sound moral argument could show rhat every member of Thoreau' political 
community had a moral ducy or obliganon to obey the law. To suppose otherwise tS, for 
example, to endorse Chief Juscice Tane ·'s statement in his Dred Scou opmion chat 
African Americans "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."17 But 
African Americans were sub1ect to legal resmctions. They were required by law ro 
behave in certain ways, including ways prescribed by the laws maincainin,g chand 
slavery. I see no reason to suppose that there was any moral pres.umption fcworin.g chcu 
obedience to such laws. le is implausible to suppose that disobedience co cheir legall · 
recognized masters or escape from their legally sanctioned enslavement required any 
moral justification at all. The mere face chat laws supported such a system could not by 
itself create a moral presumption to the contrary. But if African American sla\'es were 
not morally bound to obey all of che laws of their political communicy, chat fact alone 
precludes a comprehensive moral presumption favoring obedience to law. 
The point can be generalized, in two ways. The first point is suggested by Rawls when 
he says that 
in the long run the burdens of injustice should be more or less evenly 
distributed over different groups within society, and the hardships of 
unjust policies should not weigh too heavily in any particular case.18 
That seems a necessary condition for a political system to merit respect. Political 
obligation is compatible with some kinds of injustice, but it is incompa1tible with 
deliberate, systematic, unjustifiable discrimination (or worse) against some segment of 
the political community. Compliance even with unjust laws might be morally required 
there, in special circumstances, e.g., if char were necessary in order co avoid worse 
injustice. But ic could morally be required only on a circurriscanrial, case by case basis; 
it could never reasonably be assumed. 
If that is right, it is questionable whether any known political system has merited 
political obligation. The facts of human history argue to the contrary. 
This is not of course to say that individuals never have good reason co do what the 
law requires. A system supporting widespread injustice can have many just laws. For 
example, one should not, generally speaking, assault, cheat, coerce, harass, imprison, or 
kill another human being. Laws prohibiting such behavior can generally be justified, and 
governments can presumably be justified in enforcing such laws. A system can 
furthermore create moral reasons to comply with laws by coordinating behavior in fair 
and useful ways. Even victims of legally imposed injustice can have strong moral reason 
to comply with unjust laws, if, for example, their disobedience can expose innocent 
persons to risks they have not agreed to take. Nor is this to say that there are no morally 
significant differences among systerris. But none of this assumes or implies political 
obligation. 
Second, the targets of deliberate, systematic discrimination are not the only members 
of a political community who cannot morally be bound to respect the responsible laws. 
It makes no moral sense to suppose that beneficiaries or third parties are morally required 
to support deliberate, systematic injustice. It seems even more outlandish to suppose 
that moral principles could routinely require citizens to contribute co the systematic 
oppression than to suppose that its victims are required to cooperate in their own 
oppression. Other things being equal, morality would supporc a blanket presumption 
against compliance. 
These points can be bolstered by noting the implications in the real world of the most 
6
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widely accepted grounds of political obligauon: 
The f aJmeSs pnnaple. Many theonsts have been impressed by the promise of John 
Rawb's fairness argumenc.19 The argument seems, for example, reasonably to explam 
what others have vaguely suggested by speaking of a "social contract." 
Rawls clarified the relevant nooon of fairness by frammg the general principle chat, 
when one benefits from others' burdensome compliance with the requirements of a just 
and beneficial social pracc1ce, fairness requires that one comply '-"1th those requirements. 
The pnnciple applies when a social practice produces goods that are a\'ailable not only 
to persons who contribute to their production but also co persons who do nor contribute. 
Some persons who receive such benefits are excused from contributing to their produc­
uon !because they merit special consideration (perhaps they are physically unable to do 
what the rules require). But others are simply "free-riders." They accept the benefits but 
fail to contribute to their production by complying with the rules, when it would be 
impossible for all to do so who had equal claims to the benefits. If everyone who had equal 
claims failed co comply with the rules, the benefits would not be produced. The idea, 
then, is that one who accepts the benefits is under an obligation co those persons who help 
produce them. One who accepts che benefits without assuming the burdens takes 
advantage of those persons on whose burdensome compliance one's beneficcing depends. 
Rawls then observed that some important benefits that we enjoy depend on others' 
compliance with the law. Apparently because some of these benefits, such as personal 
security, may be said to flow from the system as a whole (or, more precisely, from others' 
respect for law}, Rawls supposed that the relevant social practice, for the application of 
the fairness principle, is the system as a whole. He argued that the fairness principle 
supports a comprehensive moral obligation to obey the law when one's benefits are 
generated by ochers' obedience co rhe law. 
ln condemning free,riding, the fairness principle may be said co require an equitable 
distribution of benefits and burdens. As Rawls notes, however, this assumes that the rules 
themselves distribute benefits and burdens fairly. Fairness cannot require one co be 
exploited by others - co acquiesce in an unjustly small share of benefits or an unjustly 
large share of burdens; but neither can it permit one to exploit others- to command an 
unjustly large share of benefits or an unjustly small share of burdens. If the benefits 
generated and the burdens imposed by the social practice are not distributed justly, the 
fairness principle does not apply. When laws support exploitation, such as chattel slavery 
or racial stratification, fairness does not require anyone to comply with those rules.20 
When the law supports unjust distributions of benefits and burdens, fairness cannot 
argue for compliance on anyone's part. But that limitation of the fairness argument 
cannot reasonably be seen as a shortcoming. When the argument fails to support a moral 
presumption favoring obedience because of unfairness in the law, that is as it should be.21 
So much for the fairness argument and compliance. 22 Let us now consider its possible 
implications for noncompliance. As we have understood it, following Rawls, the fairness 
principle applies only to nonexploitative practices. But its root objection to one's 
deliberately taking advantage of others would seem to have ·wider application. Our 
reasoning suggests that the fairness principle derives from a broader moral conception 
that objects to exploitation generally, including exploitative practices. When social 
arrangements are exploitative, fairness calls for corrective action. When a social system 
permits or provides for exploitation, the fairness principle calls for refonn. Insofar as 
resistance to prevailing arrangements is needed for refonn, fairness requires resistance 
rather than conformity. Thus, reasoning that might theoreticaHy be capable of account· 
ing for political obligation seems likely in the real world to support resistance. 
7
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We can connect this with the spirit of the fairness principle, which emphasi!es moral 
relations bern .. een individuals. According co the farimess account of political obligation, 
compliance is owe,d to ocher members of one's community. The fairness argument does 
not suggest thac che government, the state, or ics laws have any moral claim on us. le 
locates any valid claim in those who have helped produce the benefits we willingly enjoy. 
le is no wonder then chat fairness calls for resistance co exploitative arrangements under 
which we live cogecher. Such arrangements victimize other members of our community. 
Thus the moral conception that underlies the fairness principle supports a nocfon of 
political solidarity rather than conformicy. 
The dury of justice. Rawls has had second thoughts about fairness as a ground of 
political obligation. As now understood, the fairness argument does not apply to 
eveiyone who receives benefits from ochers' compliance with che rules of a fair and useful 
social practice. One who acquires a fairness-based obligation "has voluntarily accepted 
the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities ic offers to 
further one's interests. "23 Rawls believes chat chis condition is not satisfied by ordinary 
citizens, but only by individuals who deliberately seek and obtain special benefits, such 
as entrepreneurs and those who pursue and secure public office. If one wishes to account 
for political obligation, an alternative theory is required. For this purpose Rawls now 
invokes the natural duty of justice, which "binds citizens generally and requires no 
voluntary acts in order to apply":24 
This dury requires us w support and to comply with just institutions 
that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just 
arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done 
without too much cost to ourselves. 25 
Two features of the duty are especially important here. First, like the fairness principle, 
its application is limited by considerations of social justice. The duty of justice can 
ground a comprehensive moral presumption favoring obedience co law, including unjust 
laws, but only within a political system that is basically just. 26 Except in special 
circumstances, the duty of justice cannot require anyone to comply with laws that violate 
basic rights. Rawls says noc only that .. che duty to comply is problematic for permanent 
minorities thac have suffered from injustice for many years," but also that "we are not 
required to acquiesce in the denial of our own or or.hers' basic liberties."27 That is what 
we should expect of a general dury of justice. 28 
Second, the duty of justice is even more clearly two#sided than the principle of 
fairness. It explicitly requires us to promote just institutions that do not yet exist (which 
means replacing unjust social arrangements) and to address social injustice.29 How one 
should do so depends, of course, on circumstances; but it seems clear that the duty of 
justice can call for resistance rather than conformity. 
As the principle of fairness and the duty of justice concern individual conduct in a 
political context, they help to delineate political responsibility. Political theorists have 
perceived them as possible grounds of political obligation, and nothing said here rebuts 
thac possibility. The problem with such arguments for political obligation is to be found, 
not in the principles, but in the real social circumstances, which rarely if ever satisfy the 
conditions required for the principles' application. Political systems have generally 
supported deliberate, systematic oppression of or unwarranted discrimination against 
some portion of their populations. No plausible moral principle could support a 
comprehensive presumption favoring obedience to law under those conditions.30 
Political theorists rarely observe that these principles have implications for individual 
conduct when institutions are unjust. When justice or fairness can best be promoted by 
8
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disobedience, that's what those principles requue. Thus. pohtical r�sponsibilif\· goes 
significantly beyond political obligation, and it does nor always counsel compliance wich 
law. 
Two further commencs before moving on. Fust, moral icy can call for comphance co 
law in the midst of outrageous inj use ice because conditions can get worse as well as better. 
Compliance is then required, not as an expression of respect for the system, but as a means 
of preventing worse immoralities. 31 
Second, to believe that the system under which one lives possesses deep moral flaws 
is neither to condemn one's neighbors nor to assume that the system is irremediable. It 
is often to recognize the need for principled resistance.32 
II. Tax Refusal 
The initial reading of Thoreau. I have argued so far char Thoreau's rejection of political 
obligation was reasonable. I have also suggested a possible basis for the judgment of many 
resisters that they are morally required to resist. When their resistance is a response to 
societal injustice, we can account for that judgment in terms of a moral conception like 
the duty of justice. That is especially tempting in cases lilce Thoreau's, when resisters 
protest wrongs done to others. Thoreau's essay suggescs, however, a quite different view. 
Many of Thoreau's neighbors in Concord, Massachusetts, condemned governmental 
policies that supported slavery. Given the enormity of the evil, Thoreau regarded mere 
expressions of disapproval as inadequate. He began withholding payment of the 
Massachusetts poll tax in 1842 or 1843. He expected to be jailed and welcomed the 
prospect, for he wished to dramatize his protest. But he was not pressed for payment by 
the local tax collector (who was also the town constable, and a friend) until the summer 
of 1846. Persisting in his refusal, and inviting imprisonment, Thoreau was promptly 
locked up in Concord jail. His stay was unexpectedly brief, however, because someone 
paid the tax, contrary co his wishes. 
Thoreau offered a public explanation of his tax refusal in the form of a lecture 
delivered in Concord (the work we have been considering). By the time he did so, in early 
1848., there were new outrages to protest. The U.S. was invading Mexico, not least 
because those who profited from slavery sought more territory.33 Thoreau thus says, 
when a sitxth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be 
the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun 
and conquered bya foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think 
that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What 
makes this duty the more urgent is the fact, that the country so overrun 
is not our own, but ours is the invading army. (T 67) 
Thor1eau says one '"cannot without disgrace be associated" with "this American govern .. 
ment to-day .. .. I cannot for an instant recognize that politkal organization as my 
government which is the sla�e's government also." (T 67) But reform cannot be achieved 
by legal means, for "the State has provided no way" to remedy these evils: "its very 
Constitution is the evil." (T 74) So Thoreau invokes 11the right of revolution; that is, the 
right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government," (T 67) even if"blood should 
flow." (T 77) 
Thoreau does not go on to propose a bloody r·ebellion, not because he champions 
nonviolence, but because he believed at the time that the revolution must first occur in 
the individual. Thus he urges personal resistance: 
those who call themselves abolitionists should at once effectually 
9
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withdraw their support. both in person and in property. from the 
government of Massachusetts. (T 74) 
He translates this i.nco tax refusal: 
I meet this American government, or its representative the State 
government, directly, face to face, once a year, no more, in the person 
of the tax#gatherer ... and then it says distmctly, Recognize me; and the 
simplest, the most effectual, and, in the presenc posture of affairs, the 
indispensablest mode ... of expressing your litde satisfaction with and 
love for it, is to deny it then. (T 75) 
Because of their further involvement with the government, officials must do more to 
disengage: 
If the tax#gacherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has 
done, "But what shall I do?" my answer is, �·If you really wish co do any 
thing, resign your office." (T 76, 77) 
Thoreau's actual prescriptions for resistance may seem rather weak, given his 
suggestion that a bloody revolution could be justified. le is unclear whether he believed 
that tax refusal could have the desired impact. In one place he seems to say that it would: 
I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom 
I could name, - if ten honesc men only, aye, if one HONEST man, in 
this Seate of Massachusetts, ceasing w hold slatJe.S, were actually to 
withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the count)' jail 
therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. (T 75) 
On a quick reading, this passage might seem to suggest chat one person's withdrawal of 
support from the government would lead to radical reform. But that notion seems co be 
falsified by Thoreau's own case, for his tax refusal had no such repercussions. Also, he 
does not imagine merely dissociating from the government but also "ceasing to hold 
slaves." That cannot be taken literally, as chattel slavery had already ended in 
Massachusetts. 
I shall not try co unlock the meaning of that passage. Instead, I shall quote another 
passage in which Thoreau appears to explain the ground of his prescription for resistance: 
(P) It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the 
eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still 
properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, 
to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give 
it practically his support. {T 71) 
One has no overriding duty co battle injustice; but one may not ignore it: we are morally 
bound to avoid complicity in wrongdoing. 
lf l devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations. I must first see, 
at least, that I do not pursue chem sitting upon another man·s 
shoulders. (T 71) 
"What I have to do is to see ... that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn." 
(f 73) One must not be a party co injustice. 
Passage (P) suggests that one's accountability is limited to withdrawing support. That 
means we need not help redress the wrongs that have already been done. This might 
explain Thoreau's recourse to tax refusal. 
As I shall sugg,est, however, that reading commies Thoreau to an impoverished 
conception of individual accountability. It suggests that his real concern is not the 
enslaved African American, the subjugated Mexican, or the betrayed and displaced 
Native American, but his conscience. He seems preoccupied with his own moral purity. 
10
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Bedau's commeru.ary. Before pursuing that point, we must take n0te of Hugo Bedau's 
commentary. Bedau interprets Thoreau's cax refusal as mouvaced by the deslie .. to 
exculpate [him.seltl from further compltcicy m injustice!' (B 63)H In thac respect, my 
initial reading of Thoreau concurs. We are boch also cnncal of rhe posiuons artributed 
co Thoreau, but on different grounds. I'll examine Bedau's comments here and offer my 
own in the next secuon. 
Bedau understands Thoreau to hold that an individual taxpayer for his part authorizes 
the government to do what he knows it is doing and to some extenc enables the 
government to do ic.35 If rhe government aces unjustly, then che individual is morally 
required to revoke his auchorizarion and co withdraw his support. (B 60-63) There is 
some textual basis for this fmer,grained reading. We have seen, for example, that 
Thoreau says, 
chose who call chem.selves abolitionists should at once effectually 
withdraw their support, both in person and in propercy, from che 
government of Massachusetts. (T 74) 
Passages like this suggest that Thoreau believes paying taxes involves two kinds of 
support. Support "in property" presumably refers to financial backing. Support "in 
person" is not so dear. Bedau believes ic refers to one's authorizing the government's aces 
by paying taxes. 
Thoreau seems to assume that his tax payment makes a difference to the government's 
ability to implement its policies. If he did noc chink so, it is unclear what he could mean 
by support "in property" and "(practical] support." In one place he says, "I do not care 
to trace the course of my dollar 1 if I could, till it buys a man, or a musket to shoot one with." 
(T 84) To imagine that his dollar buys any such thing is to suppose that his individual 
tax payment makes a non�negligible difference to the ability of the gove·mment to 
finance its policies. 
It is unclear, however, whether Thoreau believes that in paying taxes he authorizes 
the government's acts. When he speaks of support "in person" he might be referring to 
the service that, as he observes, many citizens give to the government, some even 
allowing themselves to be used as cannon fodder. He does call on chose who condemn 
the government's conduct "to dissolve .... the union between themselves and the State, 
- and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury." (T 72) This supports Bedau's reading 
if- but only if- we make two assumpcions. Thoreau must also believe, fi.rsc, that as 
tax refusal can dissolve the union between individuals and the state, tax payments create 
such a union. Second, Thoreau must believe thac the union involves the individual's 
authorizing the state to implement its policies. 
We have some reason to hold that Thoreau does not believe these things. He says, 
for example, that he always pays the road tax because he wants to be "a good neighbor." 
(f 84) Tax payments affect moral relations with his neighbors, not with the government 
that levies the tax. Furthermore, Thoreau suggests that tax refusal is a means for 
something more radical than withdrawing authorization of government policies: 
It is for no particular item in the taxrbill that I refuse to pay it. I simply 
wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof 
from it effectually .... In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after 
my fashion, though I will still make what use and get what advantage 
of her I can, as is usual in such cases. (T 84) 
Tax refusal does not merely withdraw authorization of the government's conduct; it 
denies allegiance to the government. 
The passage just quoted recalls another, in whkh Thoreau recounts his rejection of 
11
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the government's demand chat he support the local church. which he never attended. 
To remove his name from that roll, he was obliged to submtt a formal statement that he 
did "noc wish co be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I ha\'e not 
joined."  (T 79) He could nor do the same with his governmenl. As he did nor emigrate. 
he was regarded by che government as subject to its auchoricy. We have already seen 
what he thinks of thac. To make clear that he does not accept the government's moral 
aurhority, he withholds the tax it levies. He acts so as to emphasiz·e the morally neutral 
relanon he already bears to che state. Thoreau does noc understand his relation co the 
government in moral terms, nor does he see the government as his agent. 
Bedau believes that Thoreau's tax refusal can be understood as a morally principled 
act only if he embraces the following complex position: 
A person becomes responsible for the aces of another (person, govern· 
ment) if and only if (and co the degree that) he (a) has authorized that 
other co act, or (b) has enabled that other to act, (c) knows that the 
other has used his position and authority co act, and (d) he continues 
co do (a) and (b) , i.e., he does not ace co revoke the authority granted 
or co prevent its abuse. Anyone at all responsible for unjust acts, 
whether of his own or of another's, muse ace so as to acquit himself of 
the fault incurred by that responsibility. (B 61 -62)36 
Bedau believes that chis commits Thoreau to the notion thac the quantity of one's 
protest must equal one's degree of complicity, and he faults this requirement as 
impossible co satisfy. (B 65) For there is no standard way co measure quantities of protest 
or degrees of responsibility, no less compare them. 
But chis criticism has unclear application co Thoreau, who never suggests that we 
measure protest or responsibility or chat one should equal the other. Thoreau simply calls 
on us co withdraw personal and material support of the government. With no textual 
ground for the attribution, it seems ungenerous to interpret Thoreau as commined co a 
comparison chac is admittedly impossible. 
Bedau also says that Thoreau's principle creates "an inescapably tragic dilemma" for 
resisters. (B 66) Tax refusal is supposed co reduce one's responsibility for authorizing or 
enabling the government to implement unjust policies. By parity of reasoning, an 
individual who authorizes or enables the government to implement just policies incurs 
credit for its good works. As a consequence, "che very act by which [the tax withholder] 
exculpates his responsibility for injustice is also an act by which he removes support for 
his share of che just practices of government. Tax withholding is a very blunt social 
instrument." (B 65-66) 
This point assumes that reducing responsibility with merit along with responsibility 
with fault is no better than retaining both. But that is doubtful. Consider the worst case 
according to Bedau 's reasoning. If the government does more good than harm, cax 
refusal might result in a greater loss of moral credit than of moral fault. But that should 
noc be cause for concern, because che cax ref user succeeds in avoiding all the fault that 
would be incurred by paying taxes while remaining capable of gaining moral credit 
through action as an independent moral agenc. I see no "tragic dilemma" there. 
But even the appearance of a dilemma arises only if Bedau is right in saying that tax 
refusal is a "blunt social instrument." He seems to mean ic is incapable of targeting just 
those policies and programs that are held co be objectionable. That seems to be mistaken. 
Bedau's reasoning assumes that cax payments go in.co a general fund which supports 
all governmental operations. By failing to pay che tax, one reduces support for good as 
well as bad programs. In fact, the results could be even worse than Bedau suggests. When 12
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revenues are inadequate co fund all programs, rhe govemmenc may implement programs 
selectively and favor unjusc programs. Tax refusal could be counter,productive. 
There are three enors here. First. tax refusal is noc necessarily a blunc instrument. 
A cax refuser can explain her procest and identify the laws and policies to which she 
objects. In his public lecture Thoreau explains his cax refusal and identifies the 
governmental policies he regards as unconsc ionable. 
Second, a cargeted program may be supported by revenue from a dedicated tax. One 
who wishes to withhold support from the program can refuse to pay that tax. If the poll 
tax were dedicated to the activities condemned by Thoreau, his refusal co pay would be 
discriminating in this respect. 
The Massachusetts poll tax, was probably not dedicated in that way. If so,, Thoreau's 
tax refusal could not be assumed to withhold material aid from che government's support 
of slavery, its war on Mexico, or its treatment ofNative Americans, without withholding 
support from desirable governmental programs. 
But thirdly, and most importantly, Thoreau's poll tax payment is unlikely co make any 
material difference. A single individual's poll tax in a populous scace involves coo small 
an increment of revenue relarive co the total that is either reasonably predictable or 
actually received to make any appreciable difference to the government's financial 
resources. The same is true today of most individuals' annual income tax assessments. 
As we have seen, Thoreau appears to assume that his taxes make a difference to the 
government's ability to finance its objectionable policies. If so, he was probably mistaken. 
But the financial effect of tax refusal does not exhaust its marerial impact. Although 
the direct financial repercussions of tax refusal by a single individual may be negligible, 
tax refusal may nevertheless be a significant form of protest. Accompanied by an 
explanatory message, it can inspire others to resistance. Impressed by the commianent 
of a few resisters in the face of legal sanctions, officials might fear that many will follow 
their example and withhold their taxes or take other, concerted action. This can affect 
the government's willingness to implement targeted programs. Thoreau was right to 
think that governments can be resisted "with some effect." (T 85) Small numbers of 
resisters can have a big impact. 
Bedau's objections to the principle that he accribuces to Thoreau are weak.37 They 
also seem directed at the wrong target. The reading we have both given to Thoreau does 
face a serious criticism, but it does not cum on the efficacy of tax refusal. 
Ill. Individual Accountability 
A narrow conception. To see the essential shortcoming of the view we have so far imputed 
to Thoreau, we can contrast it with the uncontroversial moral idea that we owe 
recompense to those we have wronged. Following Ross, I'll c:all this the duty of 
reparation. 38 
Wrongs vary widely - from unfair judgments to betrayals, negligence to broken 
promises - as do their consequences. Partly for that reason, we cannot say much more 
about the requirements of reparation than that we must undo the wrongs we have done. 
That is, we should take appropriate measures to undo the wrongs; for we cannot be 
required to undo fully all the wrongs that we have done. 
First, it may be impossible fully to undo a wrong. We may be unable to undo the 
damage done by an unwarranted insult or unfair judgment. We may be unable to secure 
all the resources necessary to repair a wrongful harm. We can no longer undo wrongs 
to those who have since died. I assume, however, that we are morally bound to address 13
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the wrongs we ourselves have done, by ending them, alleviating them, and compensating 
for them as best we can. 
Second, in redressing injuries.. we are not free co disregard other moral requtrements. 
Reparation is presumably a defeasible requiremenc; it may be overridden by more 
pressing moral claims. 
Third, there may be limits to the degree of personal sacrifice one is morally required 
co make in redressing "'Tongs. 
But che duty of reparation is also somewhat wider than it might at first appear. It 
presumably concerns not only wrongs we have done alone but also wrongs in which we 
have participated or are complicit. le seems co presuppose a condemnation of such 
wrongdoing. If so, ire would seem to imply that we should stop that wrongdoing or at lease 
do what we can to reduce ic. 
Perhaps most importantly, the duty of reparation calls on us to work with others where 
possible, inside or outside established political processes, to improve laws and institu, 
cions, reform public policies, and marshall resources to redress che wrongs chat we have 
collectively done. This may well be the most demanding requirement of reparation. It 
converges with political responsibility. 
The duty of reparation seems a minimal conception of one's individual accountability 
for social wrongs.39 Decency requires nothing less than addressing the wrongs chat we 
ourselves have done or to which we have contributed. This is a narrow conception 
because it does not require us to address wrongs done to others that we ourselves have 
neither done nor aided. A minimal conception of individual accountability holds, in 
other words, that individual accountability is coextensive with individual responsibility. 
The initial reading of Thoreau includes a notion of individual accountability that is 
narrower than this minimal conception in a fundamental way. The initial reading says 
chat one must noc be complicit in the government's injustices. If my government 
commits a crime, I must withdraw support. Bue that is aU. To "wash one's hands" is co 
disengage and walk away. Thus Thoreau seems to hold that one need not act to prevent 
wrongdoing chat might go on without one's involvement and - most important here ­
that one is not required to redress the wrongs already done in which one was complicit. 
By contrast, the duty of reparation -or, in ocher words, the narrow conception -
calls on us to help rectify those wrongs. The notion that we may merely disengage 
contradicts the idea that we owe recompense to those we have already wronged. 
Thoreau's rationale for tax refusal assumes that by paying taxes when we know of the 
government's crimes we are complicit in them. It would seem that Thoreau had earlier 
paid taxes while knowing of what the government was doing. The narrow conception 
requires him to help redress the wrongs to which he has already contributed. He is not 
free to "wash his hands" of the matter. The initial reading of his position denies that. 
To call a conception of individual accountability "narrow" is co allow for the 
possibility that we are in fact morally required to address a wider class of social wrongs, 
including some wrongs for which we are in no way responsible. I will distinguish three 
ideas that go beyond the narrow conception. 
Consider a young German who believes herself morally bound to help redress wrongs 
done under the Nazi regime before she was born. She believes it morally incumbent on 
her to contribute co compensatory measures, although she understands that she was not 
responsible for her government's wrongdoing. How can we interpret her moral 
convictions? 
The problem is not that there is no wrong left co address. On the contrary, wrongs 
done years ago can result in wrongful suffering and handicaps today, if not for the original 
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v1ctirn5 then for ochers, such as the Lr descendants . Recompense can snll be required. 
The problem is how persons who were not parnes to the ongmal tnJUSClCe coulJ be 
morally required to address it. 
A poliLical concepuon. 40 We should firsc consider the possibility thac cuuens41 a re 
automatically acco�ntable for the wrongs that have been done by cheir government, just 
because tr is their government, even when they them.selves were not parties to the 
government's wrongdoing. Thac idea mighc lie behind the young German's judgmenr 
that she is morally bound to help redress wrongs for which she does not hold herself 
responsible. 
A political conception of individual accountability would seem to have a nacural 
affinity to the assumption that citizens are morally bound to comply wich the laws of their 
respective communities. Both may be considered specific expressions of the notion that 
citizenship aurom.atically involves significant moral obligations. But the two ideas seem 
separable. One who believes it is incumbent: on him to help prevent and redress wrongs 
done by his government could consistently deny that there is a comprehensive moral 
presumption favoring obedience co law. 
Citizenship does not seem to be a condition of individual accountability. It is not a 
sufficient condition. Consider a former slave who was responsible neither for his 
enslavement nor for the disadvantages that result from his having been enslaved. It is 
implausible to regard him as morally required to help compensate himself for the wrongs 
that were done to him by others. If the government supported his enslavement, he is not 
morally required to help in such a way to redress some of the wrongs done by his 
government. The point may be generalized. Victims of a government's wrongdoing have 
a right to redress for chose wrongs, not an unqualified duty to help redress them.42 
Citizenship is noc a necessary condition of individual accountability, either. We may 
be morally required co address wrongs done by our government, but for reasons char are 
independent of our citizenship. Those who participate or are complicit in a government's 
wrongdoing need not be members of thac political community. Operators of a profitable 
slave trade, for example, can be outsiders. 
Because such a political conception is itselfinsupportable, it is incapable of supporting 
the idea chat one is accountable for wrongs done by one's government for which one was 
in no way responsible. I shall now suggest two other conceptions of accountability that 
could support such a judgmenc. 
Unjust enrichment. 43 The young German might have an obligation to help redress 
wrongs done by her government before she was born, if she has bcneficted from that 
wrongdoing, even though she had no other part in it. She might, for example, have 
inherited property thac was expropriated from victims of the Third Reich. Although she 
did no wrong, some of her advantages might derive from injustices co others. She might 
enjoy a standard ofliving she would not otherwise have achieved. If so, she owes redress 
co chose who have unjustly been disadvantaged by the wrong. 
I do not pretend to know what redress might be required. It seems reasonable to 
suppose, for example, chat she would be bound co share such a windfall with one who is 
worse off than she and who would have been better off but for the injustice. But even 
so simple (perhaps overly simple) a formula seems practically impossible co apply, as it 
relies on imponderable counterfaccuals. 
This suggests one reason why a political conception may seem plausible. Though 
unjust enrichment need by no means be distributed throughout a political community, 
it may be fairest and wisest to distribute the cost of whatever restitution is morally 
required. There may be no reliable and fair way to measure unjust enrichment or 15
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legirimace claims. As governments alone may have che means and resources co effect 
compensacion, the best �pproach might be for the government to provide some measure 
of restitution and distribute the costs among its citizenry. 
A related consideration suggesting a political or community-wide approach is this. 
The persons who are most likely to have valid claims (or the most pressing claims) co 
rescirution as a result of wrongs done by the government are those who need assistance. 
A humane and jusr community should undertake to address their needs in any case. 
There will be little if any need for restitution within a communicy that provides all of its 
members with basic economic, political, and social rights - or in a community that 
seriously commits itself ro and embarks upon such a program. 
We have already seen thac accountable beneficiaries of a government's wrongdoing 
need not be citizens. Now we can add that, even when they are citizens, their citizenship 
need not be the faccor that determines cheir accountability, for unjust enrichmenc is not 
automatically distributed throughout a political community. For the reasons just given, 
however, a political or community�wide approach to accountability can be defended. 
The idea of unjust enrichment might by explained, incidenrally, by reference co the 
moral conception that underlies the principle of fairness. The principle condemns free­
riding, which is exploicacion on a small scale. As I suggesced earlier, it would seem 
derivacive of a broader moral conception that also condemns exploication on a large 
scale, as in social practices distributing benefits and burdens inequitably. Unjust 
enrichment is a possible consequence of such inequicy. 
A wide conception. The duty of justice+. implies a wide conception of individual 
accountability for social wrongs, for we cannot promote justice withouc redressing 
injustice. The duty requires us not only co help eliminace unjusc social arrangements but 
also to help redress the wrongs that others have suffered, no matter who has done them, 
even if we are in no way responsible for their having been done. The duty of justice makes 
it incumbent on each of us to play our part in righting them. 
The duty of justice places no special importance on policical boundaries. We have (at 
least in the abscract) no less of an obligation to address wrongs done on the other side 
of the world than those in our neighborhood. 
Given che magnitude of suffering that flows from wrongdoing, chat seems like quite 
a demanding doctrine. Bur its actual implications for conduce are limited by practical 
considerations. Qualificacions like those we have noted for the duty of reparation apply 
here, l(OO: we cannoc be expecced to do the impossible; even if che general duty of juscice 
is itself preeminent, we must initially assume that the various specific requirements that 
flow from it are defeasible (as some of them may conflict with others); and chere may be 
limits to the degree of personal sacrifice one is morally required to make in redressing 
wrongs. 
To do any good at all we must also focus our efforts. We must consider not only che 
relative importance of different claims, but also where we can most effectively address 
social wrongs. Mose individuals' efforts can best be applied in their own policical 
communities. That is generally where we can mosc effectively join forces with ochers ­
for collective accion is generally necessary to address significanc social wrongs. Furcher� 
more, working in our home communities usually enables us to respect our other 
obligacions, based on our past interactions and current relationships with others. 
We may summarize our provisional findings as follows. Firsc, I can be morally bound 
to help redress wrongs for which I was not responsible, if I have been unjustly enriched 
through them or- in any case -as a consequence of a general duty of justice. Second, 
boch factors suggest a political approach to the redress of social wrongs. 
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Thoreau reconsidered. We are now in a position to review our initiaJ reading of 
Thoreau. In constructing it, I ignored Thoreau's qualificacions as well as other passages 
in which Thoreau endorses reparauon. The passage we relied upon is chis: 
(P) It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the 
eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still 
properly have other concerns to engage him; but lt LS his duty, at least, 
to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give 
it practically his support. (T 7 1 )  
We took this to mean that one must disengage from wrongdoing but that one has no duty 
of reparation. This suggests that Thoreau is morally self#cencered, concerned only to 
reduce his personal share of responsibility for the government's wrongdoing. 
But notice chat Thoreau says a person is not morally bound "to devote himself' co 
correcting wrongs - chat morality allows room for " other concerns." That qualification 
leaves room for a duty of reparation. 45 This revised reading is confirmed when Thoreau 
says that there are cases 
in which a people, as well as an individual, must do justice, cost what 
it may. Ifl have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must 
restore it co him though I drown myself ... .  This people must cease to 
hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their 
existence as a people.  (f 68): 
This is not only to acknowledge the duty of reparation but to regard it as having great 
weight.46 Ifl am responsible to any degree for another's wrongful injury, I may not simply 
cease my wrongdoing. I must do what I can to undo the wrong. Thoreau here establishes 
a basis for accouncabilir.y in one's past support for government :accions which wrongfully 
injure others. 
One might nevertheless wonder whether that is too generous a reading of Thoreau. 
The only action we have seen him take is tax refusal, and that would not seem to help 
repair the wrongs that have already been done. Because Thoreau believes that his tax 
payment would materially support the government's wrongdoing, he assumes that 
refusing to pay withdraws what material support he might give. Bue that is only a 
prospective remedy (and an incomplete one too, as it does not minimize continued 
wrongdoing by the government); it does not redress any wrongful injuries rto which, as 
he must believe, he has already contributed by paying taxes in the past. Either our initial 
reading was on che right track after all, and Thoreau's seeming endorsement of re para ti on 
is misleading, or else Thoreau's practice did not match his moral convictions. 
It is quite possible that Thoreau did not live up to his professed principles. Few of us 
do. But there was more to his resistance than his essay reveals. As I noted at the start, 
Thoreau was not a rigorous analyst or systematic theorist. I suggest, however, that his 
moral instincts were sound, even if his analysis of tax refusal was faulty. 
Thoreau was an active conductor on the Underground Railroad.47 This work began 
some time before his 1848 lecture on civil disobedience (his family home was a center of 
anti!·slavery activity) and continued after enactment of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Acc. 
Thoreau did not publicly discuss his assistance to fugitive slaves. To do so would have 
been irresponsible, as publicity might have endangered those he aided and might have 
closed a route to freedom. 
Given his work on the Underground Railroad, Thoreau's practice does not seem that 
of someone preoccupied with his own moral purity. For the 1850 act provided severe 
penalties for such activities. 48 And his efforts mcreased as he perceived the greater 
need.49 
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Thoreau did nor devote himself co the abolition of slavery or ro other radical reforms 
rhar he regarded as morally imperative. He did act as one who belie,·es himself moralh· 
bound w aid those who are wronged and to help alleviate the wrongs. Because he seemed 
to assume that his tax payment materially supported the government's wrongdoing and 
that he had some responsibility for unconscionable government policies, his assistance 
of fugitive slaves could manifest either a narrow or a wide conception of individual 
accountability. 
Unjust enrichment might also be relevant. Thoreau was, after all, a relatively 
privileged member of his society. He was not wealthy, but he lived on territory and used 
resources that had been seized by force, trickery, and terror from Native Americans. The 
standard of living that he enjoyed may well have been enhanced by his state's parricipa, 
tion in the slave trade (and perhaps by its provisioning U.S. forces invading Mexico). 
This could explain Thoreau's accountability for the wrongs that he recognized. 
It is important to stress the relevance of unjusc �nrichment because it applies to us 
today. One need not be a party to past injustices in order to owe redress to those of our 
neighbors who suffer from the legacy of past injustices. One need not embrace either an 
implausible political conception or even a wide conception of individual accountability 
co recognize our obligation to help redress our government's past wrongs. One need only 
forswear unjust enrichment. Given the considerable social and economic disadvantages 
imposed by past systems of injustice on immediate victims and their descendants, one 
need not be especially prosperous to be a possible beneficiary of unjust enrichment. 
In considering alternative conceptions of individual accountability, I used the 
example of a young German who believes herself morally bound to help redress wrongs 
done by her government before she was born. I might instead have mentioned a young 
American who believes he is morally required to help redress wrongs done by his 
government during the periods of chattel slavery and subsequent racist regimes. If  he is 
white and not impoverished, then he may well be the beneficiary of unjust enrichment. 
But one need not have recourse to claims of unjust enrichment. The duty of justice 
will suffice. For racism continues, though its forms evolve. Exploitation, scapegoating, 
and brutal stratification are persisting features of our political community. Current 
policies intensify the injustices and rob our least powerful neighbors of their rights and 
dignity. On any plausible conception of individual accountability, it is incumbent on us 
to address those wrongs, as well as the legacy of past wrongs. 
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Soc es 
A recent ancescor of chis paper was delivered at St;�Y Brockpon on 
October 5. 1995. I am graceful co Joe Gilbert for comments on chat ver:sion 
and co Sandy Lyoru for comments on the penulumace draft. Work on chis 
paper was supported in part by a fellowship from che National Endowment for 
the Humanities and by sabbattc support from Cornell Umvermy. which I 
gratefully acknowledge. Some of che ideas developed in ic derive from 
collaborauve re5earch and teaching with Manhew Lyons. who b noc respon­
sible for che shape chey have assumed here. 
2 Professor of Law, Boston University (Susan Linn Sage Professor of 
Philosophy Emeritus and Professor of Law Emeritus, Cornell University). 
3 Thoreau referred to that lecture as concerning "The Rights and Duties 
of :he Individual in Relation to Governmenc." le  was first published as 
"Resistance co Civil Government" in the periodical Aesthetic Papers (1849) 
and was published po6thumously as "Civil Disobedience" in a collection of his 
writings, A YanlcainCa.nada, withAnti-Sla�andRefcmn Papers_(l866). See 
Henry D. Thoreau, R.efcmn Papers, ed. Wendell Glick (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), pp. 313-32 l .  See also Walter Harding, The Dcrys of 
Henry Thoreau: A Biograplry (New York: Dover, 1982). pp. 199-208., on 
Thoreau's tax refusal generally. 
4 According to Bhi.khu Parekh, Gandhi's Politic.al Philosophy (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), pp. 20-2 I .  Gandhi was '"deeply influenced" by Thoreau, 
one of the few Western writers whom Gandhi "greatly admired." See also 
Raghavan N. Iyer, The Moral and Political Thought of Mahatma Gan.dhi_(New 
York: Oxford University Pres, 1973), pp. 266-270. For Martin Luther King, 
Jr., see his Stride TowaTd Freedom, p. 429, as reprinted in TesUimenr of Hope. 
ed. J.M. Washington (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 418-490. 
5 M.K. Gandhi, Saryagraha [Non-Violent Resi.scance], ed. B. Kumarappa 
(Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1958), p. 3. 
6 The only previous study of Thoreau by a contemporary philosopher that 
I have found is H.A. Bedau, "Civil Disobediience and Personal Responsibility 
for Injustice," The Monist 54 (1970) 527-535, reprinted in H.A. Bedau, ed., 
Ciuil Disobedience in Focus (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 49-67. I discuss 
Bedau's interpretation and critique of Thoreau below. 
1 For a survey of the recent liceracure, see Paul Harris, ed., Ciuil Disobedi­
ence (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1989). I address the 
political and analytic shortcomings of that literature in a companion paper. 
8 I speak of "accountability" when referring to the moral requirement that 
one address social wrongs, in order to allow for its possible independence from 
personal responsibility for (e.g., complicity in) che wrongs. 
9 Theorists usually refer to the govern.mencal wrongs chat are opposed by 
political resisters as "injustices." That description is often apt; it also suggests 
the gravity of the government's wrongdoing. However, the cenn does not fit 
some wrongs that have been addressed by resisters like Thoreau, which range 
from genocide to expansionist war. The distinction makes no difference for 
present purposes. 
10 Such a presumption would presumably be limited co a particular com mu-
19
Lyons: Political Responsibility and Resistance to Civil Government
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1996
Polui.cal Responsibility and Resi.sumce to Civil G°'� 23 
nicy and a morally relevant period of time. 
1 1  Such a definition would exclude Thoreau's tax withholding� but the 
definition is not at issue here. 
1 Z This is noteworthy because many contemporary political philosophers 
have come to the conclusion chat political obligation does not in face obtain. 
Political obligation is a intelligible idea, but it assumes social conditions that 
are rarely if ever satisfied. 
1 3  It is at best misleading to refer to Jim Crow as a system of segregation, for 
it was brutally enforced and was inseparable from an ideology of white 
superiority. 
14 I argue in a companion paper that Gandhi and King. as well as Thoreau, 
did not believe there is a comprehensive moral presumption favoring obedi· 
ence to law. They too saw the need for radical change of the systems under 
which they lived. 
1 5  Citations of this form refer to pages oflboreau's essay in Reform Papers. 
16 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Joel Feinberg, .. Civil Disobe­
dience in the Modem World," Humanities in Soeiery 2 ( 1979) 3 7. 59 1 reprinted 
in Civil Disobedience, ed. Paul Harris (University Press of America, 1989), pp. 
15 1 - 1 73] ;  and Chaim Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
For insighcful discussions of both civil disobedience and political obliga· 
tion, see Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Moralit;y (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987) . 
1 7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), at 407. 
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Ma.: Belknap Press, 1971).  
p. 355. Rawls does not elaborate on this point because he focuses on the 
defining characteristics of just (and "nearly just") societies. 
19 See his "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in Sidney Hook, ed., 
Law and Philosoph-y (New York: New York University Press, 1964), pp. 3- 18. 
Rawls clarified the fairness argument further in A Theory of Justice (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971), especially pp. 1 1 1- 1 14, 33 5-336, 34 2-
350, 376-377. 
20 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 1 12. 
21 In his 1964 paper Rawls assumed political obligation (cf. p.  3).  His 
account of political obligation in Theory of Justice applies only co just or "nearly 
just" societies, and Rawls makes no claim that political obligation obtains. On 
the contrary (as I note below). he indicates that lits condition (satisfaction of 
the first principle of justice) does not exist (cf. pp. 226-227). 
2 2  Joel Feinberg argues that some kinds of lawbreaking do not involve 
unfairness; see his "Civil Disobedience in the Modem World," Humanities in 
Society 2 ( 1979). especially 53-55 [reprinted in Civil Disobedience, ed. Paul 
Harris (University Press of America, 1989), pp. 169- 171 ] .  Feinberg's argu· 
ment applies to some just faws in just societies. This suggests that it may be 
a mistake to apply the fairness argument to a legal system as a whole. 
Conversely, there may be beneficial and just social practices on a smaller scale 
to which a fairness argument applies, even within unjust societies. 
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Z3 Rawls. Theory of }usnce. p. 1 1 2; see also pp. 1 1 3, 1 16. Tlus pomt 
accommodates Robert Sonclc.'s ob,ecuon rn AnaTch). Staie. and l..iiopw �ew 
York: Basic Boolc.s. 1974). pp. 90-95. 
24 Rawls, Theory of )u.suce, p. 1 16. 
25 Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 1 1 5. 
26 Rawls, Theory of ]u.su.ce, pp. 354-355.  
27 Rawls, Theory of }wru;e, p. 355, emphasis added. On pp. 226-227 Rawls 
explains how eXJ.Sting political systems, including those usually called democ­
racies, substantially violate basic liberties. Thus Rawls should be distin· 
gui.shed hom recent theorists of civil disobedience who assume political 
obligation and che conditions ic presupposes. His theory concerns "nearly 
just" societies, not those we know. 
l8 This is important because our concern here is wich justice, nor with the 
details of Rawls's theory. 
29 Rawls does noc develop this aspect of the duty as he does not deal 
excensively with non-ideal conditioru. 
30 Except as noted below. 
3 l Reasoning Wee this might argue for defense of the Union against the 
Confederacy as we 11 as defense of independent governments in La tin America 
against U.S. attempts to replace them with more compliant regimes. 
32 h is undoubtedly a virtue for a system to be capable of reform as a 
consequence of political resistance. That property should not be confused 
with the absence of profound systematic injustice. 
33 Thoreau al.so mentions a third set of governmental crimes: wichout 
elaborating he refers to the wrongs done to Native Americans. (T 76) 
34 Citations of this fonn refer to pages of the 1991 reprinting of Bedau's 
essay, in Civil Disobdience. 
35 It should be noted that Bedau refers to "the cask of justifying civil 
disobedience" (B 66) when the only aspect of civil disobedience as he defines 
it (B 5 1) which might be thought co make it need justification is its illegality. 
Bedau thus assumes political obligation, and he seems to attribute the same 
assumption to Thoreau. 
36 Bedau's formulation may be incomplrete. le implies that knowledge plus 
either authorizing or enabling is sufficient for incurring responsibility for the 
government's injustices. The exculpating actiorts include revoking authority 
and preventing its abuse but do not include refusing (further) enablemenc. 
37 Bedau also says that the principle he ascribes to Thoreau does not help 
to justify civil disobedience because it does not exclude violence, but he 
recognizes that resisters can have adequate independent reason for avoiding 
violence. (B 66) He says that the principle cannot justify indirect resistance 
by those who "do not see themselves as having any responsibility for the 
injustices they wish to protest," (B 64), but he seems unsure whether this 
constitutes a failing of the principle or of those resisters. 
38 W .D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 
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39 The least demanding conception .... 'OUld require one to devote little effort 
and resources co redress wrongs and would allow the obligation ro be 
overridden easily. 
40 A political conception would presumably supplement rather than re­
place the narrow conception. 
41 I refer here generally to those who normally reside in and are routinely 
subject to the laws of a political community, not to some privileged subclass 
called "citizens" who enjoy special status and who alone possess a full share 
of political rights .. 
42 One can have a duty to help redress wrongs done to oneself because one 
can have a duty to bring wrongs to public notice and to take appropriate action 
to rectify the wrongs, e.g., when others have also been victimized or others 
may well be wronged unless such action is ta'ken. I am grateful to Susan 
Koniak for this suggestion. 
43 Unjust enrichment. too, would presumably .;upplement rather than 
replace the narrow conception. 
44 As I noted earlier, our concern here is with how we may reasonably 
understand a duty of justice. We are not concerned with any particular 
theory, such as Rawls's. 
45 Though it is ambiguous: it could mean that one i.s not accountable for 
all social wrongs or that the duty (whatever its scope) is defeasible. 
46 Weight must be distinguished from scope. To regard the duty of 
reparation as very sttong is not to imply accountability for wrongs done 
entirely by others. Thoreau's examples may also mislead as to the weight he 
would assign the duty; in them reparation is totally impossible without great 
sacrifice. 
47 See Walter Harding, The Days of Henry Thoreau: A Biography (Dover 
1982), pp. 1 95-6, 3 14-7. 
48 The 1850 act, which amended the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, commit­
ted not only the federal government much more sttongly to the support of 
slavery but the states and the entire population, e.g., by subjecting individuals 
to conscription into search and capture parties and imposing severe penalties 
on private individuals for failing fully to cooperate and strict liability on 
officials for alleged fugitives who escaped from their care. (Its provisions for 
summary hearings also violated due process in allowing no testimony from 
alleged fugitives and awarding commissioners double fees when they judged 
slaveowners' claims favorably.) 
49 Thoreau responded to the crises of the 1850s by endorsing more militant 
measures against slavery. Aher the raid on Harper's Ferry, Thoreau was the 
first and for some time the only public figure openly to defend John Brown. 
See Harding, Days of Henry Thoreau, pp. 41 5�426, on Thoreau's supporc of 
Brown and his aid for Brown's associates. His increasing militancy i.s evident 
in the Reform Papers essays: "Resistance to Civil Government" ( 1848), pp. 63 • 
90; "Slavery in Massachusetts" (1854), pp. 91-109; and three essays on Brown 
( 1859). pp. 1 1 1-153. See also the Textual Inrroductions in Refcmn Papers, pp. 
3 1 3ff. 22
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